K. Sugiura (1) , H. Ogura (1) , K. Ito (1) , K. Ishikawa (1) K. Hoshino (1) & K. Sakamoto (2) (1) Animal Health Division, Livestock Industry Department, Agricultural Production Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 1-2-1 Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-8950, Japan On 24 March, serum samples from nine animals showed high antibody levels in the liquid-phase blocking (LPB) ELISA; on 25 March, all ten animals on the farm were assessed as being affected by FMD, and the animals were destroyed on 26 March.
Chinese wheat straw, used as a feedstuff on Farm A, was suspected as a source of FMD virus. Of the 23 farms found to be using Chinese wheat straw from the same source, none was found to be affected by FMD, following clinical and serological investigations. No evidence was found to suggest that the movement of animals, vehicles or people, or air-borne transmission were sources of infection.
Farm B
Farm B was a cow-calf operation with nine Japanese Black cattle (six cows and three calves). Serum samples obtained on 29 March revealed that three animals had antibody levels greater than 1:45 in the LPB-ELISA. On 2 April, serum samples were taken from all nine cattle, six of which showed a rise in antibody level. On 3 April, the farm was assessed as being affected by FMD, and all the cattle were destroyed on 4 April.
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Rev. sci. tech. Off. int. Epiz., 20 (3) Japan has an area of approximately 370,000 square kilometres and consists of four principal islands, namely: Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu. Kyushu and Hokkaido islands, where the outbreaks of FMD were recorded, are the primary livestock-producing areas of the country. In Kyushu, many small-scale cow-calf operations exist, in which Japanese Black cattle are kept; the Japanese Black is one of the principal breeds of beef cattle in Japan, a 'wagyu' breed that produces high quality beef. Kyushu is also a major area for pig production. Many large-scale beef and dairy farms are located in Hokkaido.
Outbreaks of foot and mouth disease
On 25 March 2000, an outbreak of FMD was reported on a beef cattle fattening farm in Miyazaki City, Miyazaki Prefecture. Following this outbreak, farms in the movement control and surveillance areas, farms with epidemiological links to the infected farm and farms that were using imported forage as feed, were subjected to serological surveillance. As a result, two cow-calf operations in Takaoka town, adjacent to Miyazaki City and one farm in Honbetsu town, Hokkaido Prefecture, were confirmed as being affected by FMD. These farms are named A, B, C and D, respectively. Information concerning the location of the four outbreaks, the number of susceptible animals kept on the farms, the clinical signs and the results of laboratory investigations, are presented in Table II . The maps in Figure 1 indicate the location of these outbreaks.
Farm A
Ten Japanese Blacks were being kept on farm A, for fattening purposes. On 8 March, the farmer found cattle showing pyrexia, anorexia and coughing. A private veterinarian visited the farm on 12 March and found anorexia and nasal and mouth erosions which were spreading to other cattle. The veterinarian reported the observations to Miyazaki Livestock Hygiene or sugar cane from the same source were found to be infected with FMD virus. No evidence has been found to suggest that the movement of animals, vehicles or people, or air-borne transmission were sources of infection. Prefectures are adjacent to the Miyazaki Prefecture and some of the cities and towns in the former Prefectures were located in the surveillance area. These FMD emergency management units were responsible for the co-ordination of eradication activities taken at all levels.
Eradication measures
During the eradication campaign, the voluntary defence associations provided farmers with disinfectants, helped increase the awareness of farmers in regard to clinical signs of FMD, and promoted the early notification of animals which were suspected of being affected by FMD. Figure 2 illustrates the organisational relationship between MAFF, the prefecture governments and voluntary defence associations.
Depopulation of infected farms
Immediately after diagnosis of FMD, all animals kept on the four infected farms were destroyed. Feed, bedding materials, manure and compost were buried. Housing facilities and equipment used for handling the animals were disinfected.
Stamping-out on Farms A, B and C was completed in a single day, while four days were required to complete stamping-out on Farm D. 
Movement control
On 25 March, when the first outbreak was suspected on Farm A, a movement control area of 20 km in radius was established, which included twelve cities, towns and villages. A surveillance area of between 20 and 50 km in radius around Farm A, including thirty-two cities, towns or villages was established on the same day.
In the movement control area, the movement of cloven-hoofed animals, farm equipment and other goods that had the potential to become a mechanical vector of infection, was prohibited. Livestock markets and slaughterhouses were closed and reproduction and artificial insemination practices were prohibited in this area.
On 23 April, the surveillance area was lifted and the movement control area was reduced to a 10-km radius around Farm B and around Farm C. The epidemiological findings at that date provided no evidence of air-borne transmission. On 26 April, the movement control area was further reduced to an area of 10-km radius around Farm C; this was lifted on 2 May.
On 11 May, when the outbreak on Farm D was confirmed, a movement control area of 10 km in radius was established and the movement of cloven-hoofed animals and other goods that had the potential to become a mechanical vector of infection, pasturing of animals, reproduction and artificial insemination were prohibited in this area. There was no slaughterhouse in this area. The movement control was lifted on 9 June.
Road blocks and disinfection points were established on main roads bordering the movement control and surveillance areas. Vehicles transporting feedstuffs and milk were disinfected at these points.
Voluntary Defence Associations, agricultural co-operatives and mutual assistance co-operatives conducted disinfection of farms and milk collection facilities in the movement control and surveillance areas.
Vaccines and vaccination
No vaccination was used for the eradication of FMD. For emergency use, MAFF imported 3.8 million doses of type O vaccines between 3 and 27 April. This was in addition to the 300,000 doses imported annually. All vaccines are stored at the Animal Quarantine Services and other national institutions under the supervision of MAFF.
Information activities
The MAFF issued a total of sixty-one press releases between 25 March 2000 and 27 September 2000; these were available on the MAFF homepage (http://www.maff.go.jp/eindex.html).
On 27 March, the National Voluntary Defence Association circulated 266,000 copies of leaflets with colour photographs of FMD lesions, to stimulate vigilance and awareness of farmers and urging the early notification of animals with clinical signs suggestive of FMD.
Reports were sent to the Office International des Epizooties (OIE) in accordance with the requirements of the OIE International Animal Health Code (8) . Japan notified the OIE by facsimile on the evening of 25 March (local time in Japan). This report described the nature of diagnosis, the date of initial detection of an animal health incident, the outbreak location, the number of outbreaks, a description of the affected population, the total number of animals in the outbreak, the laboratory in which diagnosis was performed, the diagnostic tests used, the causal agent, the source of agent/origin of infection and the control measures taken during the reporting period. Following this emergency report, Japan sent seven follow-up reports to the OIE between 25 March 2000 and 26 September 2000; these were sent by Dr Matsubara, the Delegate from Japan to the OIE at that time.
Other measures
To protect Japan from further introduction of FMD, imports of straw and forages from Taipei China were subjected to SK-disinfection on arrival in Japan from 27 March 2000. This involved using fumigation with pressured formalin gas (6) . The straw and forages imported from other FMD-affected countries/areas were subjected to this disinfection procedure from 30 March 2000. Farmers were also instructed not to use imported straw and forage for feed or bedding.
Importation of meat and meat products of cloven-hoofed animals from the Republic of Korea was suspended on 27 March, soon after FMD was suspected to have been reported in that country, and was prohibited on 10 April, after the completion of legal formalities. 
Surveillance
Two forms of surveillance were conducted, as described below.
The LPB-ELISA was used to screen the sample animals for antibodies against FMD, following the procedures described in the OIE Manual of Standards for Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines (OIE Manual) (7) using kits provided by the World Reference Laboratory for FMD in Pirbright, United Kingdom. The virus neutralisation test (VNT) was also used for definitive diagnosis, following the procedures described in the OIE Manual (7).
For virus diagnosis, the sandwich ELISA (S-ELISA) and virus isolation were used to detect antigen or infectious virus, in accordance with the procedures described in the OIE Manual (7). The RT-PCR procedure was also used for detecting evidence of FMD virus genome in samples using the method described by Forsyth et al. (4) .
Clinical surveillance
Clinical diagnosis was performed after an examination of animals for vesicles, erosions and ulcers in the mouth, or on the hoofs or udders, and for excessive salivation, difficulty in mastication, acute lameness and poor general condition. Prefecture veterinary inspectors were later instructed to examine the animals very carefully, bearing in mind that the overt clinical signs associated with infection with the type O strain in Japan may not be easy to detect. Private veterinarians and farmers were warned to inform the Livestock Hygiene Service Centres immediately if any animal presenting such clinical signs was found.
Between 25 March and 9 June, a total of 93,225 visits were made by prefecture veterinary inspectors for clinical surveillance purposes (Table III) . In the same period, 143,306 farm visits were made by private veterinarians. All the farms in the movement control and surveillance areas and some other farms in other parts of the country were incorporated in this clinical surveillance programme. As a result, thirty-one cases were reported to the MAFF. Diagnostic samples were submitted to the NIAH. No case was diagnosed as FMD following LPB-ELISA, S-ELISA and RT-PCR, or after attempting to isolate virus in tissue culture from lesion swabs and probang samples.
Serological surveillance
After the first outbreak in Miyazaki Prefecture, 47,177 serum samples from 27,890 farms were collected by prefecture veterinary inspectors in accordance with the sampling regime described in Table IV . The number of farms and animals subjected to the serological surveillance is detailed in Table V . The farms involved were as follows:
-all cattle farms in the movement control and surveillance areas -farms that had introduced animals from farms in the movement control and surveillance areas in the preceding three months -farms on which imported forages were fed to animals. Figure 3 outlines the measures taken. Sera were sent to the NIAH and were screened for antibody using the LPB-ELISA, with a cut-off value of 1:90. All sera with antibody levels exceeding 1:90 were titrated in the LPB-ELISA.
At least one animal with an antibody level in excess of 1:45 was found on 405 farms. These farms were re-tested using at least ten sera collected from each of the farms. Farms were considered to be free from infection if all the sampled animals reacted negatively or if only one animal reacted positively with a high antibody level (but not in excess of 1:181). Farms on which one animal had an antibody level higher than 1:181 after the ELISA, but had an antibody level lower than 1:45 using VNT were considered to be free from infection.
As serological surveillance progressed, it was found that 1% to 2% of the animals sampled always reacted positively (an antibody level of 1:45 or higher), irrespective of the areas, and these criteria were developed to distinguish between false and true positives.
In this way, two farms were considered infected (Farms B and C) and sixty farms were suspected of harbouring infection (Fig. 3) . These sixty farms were subjected to the Herd under Quarantine Programme detailed in Figure 4 . As a result of this programme, all sixty farms subsequently proved to be free from FMD, with the exception of Farm D.
As part of the Herd under Quarantine Programme, probang material was collected by prefecture veterinary inspectors from seropositive animals using a probang (sputum) cup. By mid- April, two weeks after the initial outbreak, MAFF arranged for 500 probang cups to be supplied to Livestock Hygiene Service Centres. The MAFF also supplied video tapes showing the use of probang cups. Probang materials were collected in accordance with the procedures described in the OIE Manual (7) and sent to the NIAH for virus isolation, antigen detection ELISA and RT-PCR.
Between the date of the outbreak on Farm D in Hokkaido Prefecture and 20 May, all 139 farms in the movement control area, and 85 farms that shipped animals to Farm D, were subjected to serological testing in accordance with the sampling regime described in Table VI . All of these 224 farms proved to be free of FMD (Table VII) .
Sources of infection

Virus strain involved in the outbreaks
The sequence data of the VP1 gene of the FMD virus detected from an animal on Farm A were sent to the World Reference Laboratory in Pirbright, and on 4 April confirmation was received indicating that the virus was a close match to those from type O viruses isolated in countries in Asia. This represented less than a 3% nucleotide difference (nucleotides 469-639 of VP1) between the virus isolated in Japan 
Epidemiological studies
The disease began on three farms located in a limited area extending over 9 km in two adjacent municipalities along the Oyodo River (including tributaries) and on one farm in Hokkaido. On the basis of the estimated exposure date, use of forage from countries in East Asia and gene sequence similarity, Farm A is considered to be the primary outbreak, from which location the disease spread locally to Farms B and C.
The following facts support the hypothesis that wheat straw which originated from the People' s Republic of China, used on Farm A, carried the FMD virus to Japan:
-Farm A used wheat straw imported from the People' s Republic of China as a feedstuff -the wheat straw from the People' s Republic of China was imported in winter, when FMD virus reportedly survives for longer periods -some of the wheat straw from the People' s Republic of China was found to be stained with faecal-like substances (this was confirmed later in the autumn of 2000 [5] )
-importation of wheat straw from the People' s Republic of China has increased significantly since 1997 -the Prefectures of Miyazaki and Hokkaido store and consume much greater amounts of imported wheat straw than other prefectures (Tables VIII and IX) .
Other possible sources were considered, but no evidence was found to suggest any other means of introduction of FMD into Japan.
The VP1 gene sequence of the virus segment isolated from the outbreak in Hokkaido was identical to the gene sequences isolated from Farms A and C. This could mean that the virus in Hokkaido was transmitted from Miyazaki or that the viruses had the same origin in East Asia. However, no epidemiological factors have enabled a link to be established between Farm D and Farms A, B or C. Other possible explanations will have to be considered.
Economic losses
Direct economic losses
The owners of the four farms A, B, C and D were compensated for the animals which were destroyed and for part of the costs of destruction and burial (Table X) .
Indirect economic losses
In addition to the compensation paid to the farmers, budgets were allocated for FMD eradication and related measures as detailed in Table XI . Substantial expenditure was required by the prefecture governments for FMD eradication and other related measures, which is not included in Table XI . Most of these budgets can be considered to be indirect economic losses.
Japan exports beef and other livestock products, principally to countries in South-East Asia. These exports were suspended when the first outbreak was reported on 25 March 2000. On 31 March 2001, Australia, Brazil, the People' s Republic of China, Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand lifted the import ban, while the markets of the United States of America and Taipei China remain closed to the import of cloven-hoofed animals and the products of these animals from Japan. The economic losses caused by this export suspension are currently being calculated. The number of animals sampled was set to provide 95% probability of detecting evidence of foot and mouth disease if present at a prevalence of 10% in cattle herds and 20% in pig herds period of time. Control measures consisted of depopulation of the infected herds, movement control of animals and animal products within the area surrounding the infected premises and intensive clinical and serological surveillance in the movement control and other areas. Over 60,000 animals from 27,000 farms were subjected to serological surveillance for a period of two months. To the knowledge of the authors, this is the first time that serological surveillance on such a scale has been performed in such a short time. The authors acknowledge that some of the sampling regimes used in the serological surveillance did not have a statistical basis, but this was complemented by clinical surveillance, including 237,000 farm visits by prefecture veterinary inspectors or private veterinarians. Serological surveillance demonstrated the absence of infection in the respective areas. Sampling of all the farms in the movement control and surveillance areas also had the effect of providing every farmer in these areas some assurance of negative test results. Wheat straw from the People' s Republic of China which was used as feed in the primary outbreak was the most probable source of infection for the outbreaks in the Miyazaki Prefecture. In regard to the source of infection for the outbreak in Hokkaido, no evidence has been found to explain the means of entry of the virus into this Prefecture, either from Miyazaki or from another country in Asia. 
